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Structure, Substance and Spirit: 
Lessons in Constitutional 
Architecture from the  
Senate Reform Reference  
Kate Glover* 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE META-STRUCTURE 
By the time the Reference re Senate Reform
1
 came along, the 
Supreme Court of Canada had already expressed its view that Canada’s 
Constitution has a “basic structure” or “internal architecture”.2 It had also 
already expressed the view, although not without controversy, that this 
“basic structure” has some measure of normative and interpretive force.3 
                                                                                                                                  
*  B.A. (McGill, 2003), LL.B. (Dalhousie, 2006), LL.M. (Cambridge, 2008), D.C.L. (McGill, 
2015 (expected)), Vanier Canada Graduate Scholar (2012-2015). Junior counsel for the amicus curiae 
in the Senate Reform Reference (2013). A first version of this paper was presented at Osgoode Hall’s 
17th Annual Constitutional Cases Conference (April 2014). I am grateful to the Conference organizers 
for inviting me to present this paper and to Professor Roderick Macdonald, the Conference participants, 
and the two anonymous peer reviewers from the Supreme Court Law Review for their insightful 
comments on earlier versions. All errors are my own. 
1  Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, 2014 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Senate Reform Reference”].  
2  Senate Reform Reference, id., at para. 26, citing Reference re Secession of Quebec, 
[1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 50 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Secession Reference”]; 
OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 57 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “OPSEU”]; Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.), 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Remuneration Reference”]; Reference 
re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21, at para. 82 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Supreme Court Act Reference”]. 
3  On using the structural dimensions of the Constitution in the process of constitutional 
interpretation and application, see, e.g., Secession Reference, id., at paras. 49-54, 148; OPSEU, id.; 
Supreme Court Act Reference, id.; Remuneration Reference, id.; Reference re B.C. Motor Vehicle 
Act, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 499-513, esp. 500-504 and 511-33 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”]; R. v. Demers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489, 
2004 SCC 46, at para. 86 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Demers”], per LeBel J.; Mark D. Walters, “Written 
Constitutions and Unwritten Constitutionalism” in Grant Huscroft, ed., Expounding the Constitution: 
Essays in Constitutional Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 245, at 265ff. 
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While questions remained, we also already knew that the building blocks 
of the Constitution are linked to one another and that their meaning 
depends on the structure of the Constitution as a whole.
4
 Further, we 
knew that the structure of the Constitution contemplates the existence of 
certain political and judicial institutions and the “basic structural 
imperatives” that govern them.5 Moreover, we knew that the “castle of 
the Constitution”6 rests on a foundation of fundamental yet unstated 
values and assumptions.
7
 These values and principles are the scaffolding 
around which the Constitution as a whole is constructed and are mixed 
into the mortar that holds the building blocks together.
8
 
The Court’s unanimous reasons in the Senate Reform Reference add 
to what we already knew about the structure of the Constitution. The 
Court reiterated that the Constitution is not a “mere collection of discrete 
textual provisions”, but rather has “an architecture, a basic structure”.9 It 
affirmed that elements of this architecture must be considered when 
interpreting, understanding and applying the Constitution.
10
 Further, the 
Court held that constitutional architecture is not merely an aid to 
interpretation. Rather, at least some architectural elements are 
constitutionally entrenched and therefore can be altered only by virtue of the 
amending procedures set out in Part V of Canada’s Constitution Act, 198211 
                                                                                                             
[hereinafter “Walters, ‘Written and Unwritten’”]; Robin Elliot, “References, Structural 
Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada’s Constitution” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 67 
[hereinafter “Elliot”]. On structural analysis generally, see e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and 
Relationship in Constitutional Law (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969) 
[hereinafter “Black”]; Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1982) [hereinafter “Bobbitt”]; and J. Harvie Wilkinson III, “Our Structural 
Constitution” (2004) 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1867 [hereinafter “Wilkinson”].  
4  Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 50. 
5  OPSEU, supra, note 2, at 57. See also Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2. The 
institutional configuration created by the Constitution establishes and governs relationships between 
the individual and the state, as well as between the institutions themselves: Demers, supra, note 3, at 
para. 86, per LeBel J., and the sources cited therein. 
6  Remuneration Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 109.  
7  Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 49-51.  
8  Secession Reference, id., at paras. 49-51. The “castle” and “bricks and mortar” metaphor 
only goes so far in light of the primary metaphor that describes the Constitution of Canada, the living 
tree: Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124, at 136 [hereinafter “Edwards”]. The 
former should not be read as suggesting that the Constitution is cemented into any particular 
configuration. Even a castle and bricks and mortar can be renovated and rearranged. 
9  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 27. 
10  Id., at para. 26. 
11  Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. In this article, all constitutional 
provisions are references to the Constitution Act, 1982, unless otherwise indicated.  
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(“Part V”).12 Further, the Court showed that when determining which 
amending procedure applies to a particular reform proposal, we should 
consider the effect of the reform on the constitutional order as a whole. 
Finally, the Court explained the Senate’s role within the structure of 
Canada’s Constitution, namely, as a core but complementary legislative 
body of sober second thought within a bicameral Parliament.
13
 This 
sketch of the Senate within the bigger constitutional picture also 
illuminated the rationale behind the Senate’s internal structural design. 
The Court’s reasoning shows how particular features of the Senate’s 
institutional configuration, such as the appointed status of senators and 
their potentially long tenure, were ways in which the framers sought to 
bring to life their vision of a complementary, independent, regionally 
representative chamber of legislative review. 
But while the Court’s reasons in the Senate Reform Reference 
advance our understanding, they also raise questions about the normative 
force of Canada’s constitutional structure and about the extent and 
implications of its entrenchment. Moreover, the reasons reveal that 
traditional understandings of structural analysis offer an incomplete 
account of how and why constitutional structure matters in the specific 
context of interpreting Part V’s amending procedures.  
In light of these questions and ambiguities, this paper aims to shed 
light on what we did and did not learn from the Senate Reform Reference 
about the structure of the Constitution and about its role in constitutional 
interpretation. In the next Part, I summarize the issues and outcomes in 
the Senate Reform Reference and explain what this paper contributes to 
the post-Reference constitutional conversation. I show that the case is 
more about reform than it is about the Senate, and that we must care 
about proper procedure when amending the Constitution. In Part III, I 
show that traditional approaches to structural analysis rightfully played 
an important role in the Court’s interpretation of Part V in the Reference. 
The principles that course through the veins of the Constitution
14
 give 
reason and spirit to the technicalities of Part V. In Part IV, I argue that the 
Court could have relied on the internal structure of Part V in order to 
                                                                                                                                  
12  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at paras. 27, 54-60, 107. For further discussion 
of the entrenchment of constitutional architecture, see Section V below, in particular under the 
heading “Step One: Scope”. 
13  See, e.g., Senate Reform Reference, id., at paras. 54-60, 95-110. 
14  As the Court notes in the Secession Reference, id., at para. 51, the principles underlying 
the constitution “dictate major elements of the architecture of the Constitution itself and are as such 
its lifeblood”. 
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determine the meaning of each amending formula. In Part V, I contend 
that the logic of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 creates a two-step 
analytical structure for working through procedural disputes about 
constitutional amendment. Each step of the framework contemplates 
structural questions. I show that while the Court adopted this two-step 
framework, ambiguity remains as to when Part V is triggered.  
I conclude this paper by summarizing the lessons learned from the 
Senate Reform Reference about constitutional architecture in the 
context of formal constitutional amendment. These lessons establish 
that first, in order to interpret and apply Canada’s constitutional 
amending procedures, we should be attentive to various forms of 
constitutional structure — traditional, internal and analytical. Second, 
in the interpretation and application process, different types of 
constitutional structure matter to different degrees. For example, the 
Constitution’s underlying principles will always set boundaries around 
the range of available interpretations. Further, structural factors may 
have the most interpretive weight when they help justify non-
formalistic readings of the text and when they help make sense of 
generic language that is of open descriptive value. They may have the 
least weight when relied on to read in language that does not otherwise 
have an explicit textual hook within Part V. Third, we learn from the 
Reference that constitutional structure is not merely a formal issue or 
tool; it is a matter of substance.  
II. THE ISSUES AND OUTCOMES OF THE  
SENATE REFORM REFERENCE 
In February 2013, the Governor in Council submitted six questions 
to the Supreme Court of Canada for hearing and consideration.
15
 The 
Court was asked to determine whether Parliament was constitutionally 
required to obtain the provinces’ consent before changing the legislative 
and constitutional configuration of the Senate. The questions 
contemplated four areas of possible reform: the length of senatorial 
terms; the process for nominating candidates for Senate seats; the 
eligibility of candidates; and abolition of the Senate. The Attorney 
General of Canada argued that Parliament could unilaterally set term 
                                                                                                                                  
15  P.C. 2013-70.  
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limits for senators,
16
 revoke the net worth and real property qualifications 
for senators
17
 and legislate a framework for advisory elections for 
senatorial candidates.
18
 In addition, it submitted that Parliament could 
abolish the Senate with the consent of the legislative assemblies of seven 
provinces representing 50 per cent of the population.
19
  
The Court’s task in the Senate Reform Reference was to determine the 
proper constitutional procedure for implementing the reforms 
contemplated in the reference questions.
20
 This determination turned on the 
Court’s interpretation of Part V. Part V, the “Procedure for Amending [the] 
Constitution of Canada”, contains multiple amending procedures.21 
Together, the procedures prescribe which orders of government, in what 
numbers, must consent to which amendments, in what circumstances.
22
 
The general amending procedure (section 38(1)) provides that 
constitutional amendments require the consent of Parliament and the 
legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces representing 
50 per cent of the population. This “7/50 rule” applies generally, as well as 
to amendments in relation to some expressly listed matters, including the 
powers of the Senate, the method of selecting senators, the number of 
                                                                                                                                  
16  At present, the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict, c. 3 [reprinted in R.S.C. 
1985, App II, No. 5] provides that senators must be at least 30 years old when appointed (s. 23(1)) 
and can hold their seat until age 75 (s. 29(2)). 
17  At present, a senator must own real property with net value of at least $4,000 in the 
province for which he or she is appointed (Constitution Act, 1867, s. 23(3)) and have a net worth of 
at least $4,000 (Constitution Act, 1867, s. 23(4)). 
18  Senators are appointed by the Governor General (Constitution Act, 1867, s. 24) at 
the recommendation of the Prime Minister (by constitutional convention). There is currently 
no federal legislation setting out a selection procedure for senators. Some provinces have 
tabled or enacted legislation creating schemes by which electors in the province vote for their 
preferred senatorial candidates. The results of those elections are then submitted to the Prime 
Minister for consideration. In the existing legislative landscape, the Prime Minister is not 
legally bound to consider the provincial lists. 
19  At present, s. 17 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides: “There shall be one 
Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, an Upper House styled the Senate, and the 
House of Commons.”  
20  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at paras. 4, 20. 
21  In any particular case, determining which procedure applies depends on the subject 
matter and scope of the proposed amendment. The amending procedures set out in ss. 38, 41, 42 and 
44 apply to amendments “in relation to” a list of “matters”, while the procedures set out in ss. 43 and 
45 apply to amendments of particular scope. Section 43 applies to amendments to any provision of 
the Constitution of Canada that applies to one or more, but not all, provinces. Section 45 applies to 
amendments to the constitution of a province. 
22  The provisions of Part V can be divided into two groups. One group — ss. 38(1)-(3), 41, 
42, 43, 44, 45 and 47(1) — prescribes the consensus required for entrenching a formal constitution 
amendment. The other group — ss. 38(4), 40, 46, 47(2), 48 and 49 — deal with the logistics of the 
amendment process, including provincial compensation and timelines. 
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senators representing a province, and the residence qualifications of 
senators (section 42(1)(b), (c)).
23
 In contrast, amendments in relation to the 
office of the Queen, the use of the English or French language, or the 
composition of the Supreme Court require the unanimous consent of 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures (section 41).
24
 There is also a 
“special arrangement” procedure (section 43). It provides that an 
amendment to any provision of the Constitution of Canada that applies to 
one or more, but not all, provinces requires the consent of Parliament and 
the legislative assembly of the provinces to which the amendment applies. 
Finally, in some cases, federal (section 44) and provincial (section 45) 
actors can implement constitutional amendments unilaterally. In particular, 
Parliament alone can, with some exceptions, amend the Constitution in 
relation to the executive, the Senate and the House of Commons. 
Prior to the Senate Reform Reference, Canadian courts had rendered 
opinions about the proper procedure for amending the Constitution.
25
 
However, at the time of the Reference hearing, the Court had never 
before interpreted Part V in any comprehensive way.
26
 The issues in the 
Senate Reform Reference not only created the opportunity for such an 
interpretation, they called for it. Indeed, to answer the reference 
                                                                                                                                  
23  In addition, s. 42(1) applies to amendments in relation to the principle of proportionate 
representation in the House of Commons, the Supreme Court of Canada (subject to s. 41(d)), the 
extension of existing provinces into the territories and the establishment of new provinces. 
Sometimes, the provinces can opt out of amendments enacted by virtue of the general rule (s. 38(3)). 
No such opt-out is available for amendments that fall under s. 42(1) (s. 42(2)). 
24  In addition, s. 41 applies to amendments in relation to the office of the Governor General 
and the Lieutenant Governor of a province, the right of a province to a number of members in the 
House of Commons not less than the number of senators by which the province was entitled to be 
represented in 1982, and Part V.  
25  Reference re Legislative Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper House, [1979]  
S.C.J. No. 94, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Upper House Reference”]; Reference re 
Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Patriation Reference”]; Reference re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution, 
[1982] S.C.J. No. 101, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Veto Reference”]; Secession 
Reference, supra, note 2; Reference re Bill C-7 Concerning the Reform of the Senate, [2013] Q.J.  
No. 7771, 2013 QCCA 1807 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Q.C. Senate Reference”]; Hogan v. 
Newfoundland (Attorney General), [2000] N.J. No. 54, 2000 NFCA 12 (Nfld. C.A.), leave to appeal 
refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 191 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hogan”]; Penikett v. R., [1987] B.C.J. No. 
2543, 21 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1988] S.C.C.A. No. 125, 46 D.L.R. 
(4th) vi (note) (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Penikett”]; Campbell v. Canada, [1988] B.C.J. No. 442, 49 
D.L.R. (4th) 321 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1988] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Campbell”]; Potter v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2001] J.Q. no 5553 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal 
refused [2002] 3 S.C.R. x (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Potter”]. 
26  By the time the Senate Reform Reference opinion was released, the Court had begun its 
interpretation of Part V in the Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 72-106. 
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questions, the Court had to determine whether the government’s 
proposals for Senate reform triggered Part V and if so, which amending 
procedures applied. The answers were not obvious on the face of the 
constitutional text, the proposed amendments or the jurisprudence. 
Ultimately, a unanimous eight-judge panel of the Court rejected the 
lion’s share of the government’s submissions. The judges concluded that 
the 7/50 rule applied to the government’s proposals to implement 
advisory elections.
27
 According to the Court, introducing such elections 
would endow senators with a popular mandate inconsistent with the 
Senate’s role as a complementary legislative chamber of sober second 
thought. This would constitute an amendment to the Constitution of 
Canada in relation to the method of selecting senators and would thus 
require substantial provincial consent. Similarly, the Court held that the 
proposal to implement defined terms for senators triggered the general 
amending procedure.
28
 According to the Court, the contemplated changes 
to tenure would affect the “fundamental nature and role” of the Senate by 
weakening senatorial independence. This engaged the interests of all 
parties to Confederation and thus called for substantial provincial input.
29
  
In addition, the Court concluded that unanimous provincial consent 
was required to abolish the Senate.
30
 Abolition would remove the 
bicameral form of government underlying Canada’s constitutional order. 
This would fundamentally alter the process of constitutional amendment 
in Canada and thereby require the unanimous consent of Parliament and 
the provinces.  
Finally, the Court accepted the Attorney General of Canada’s 
submission that Parliament is authorized to unilaterally repeal the 
requirement that senators have a personal net worth of at least $4,000.
31
 
Moreover, it accepted the submission that Parliament has the authority to 
unilaterally repeal the requirement that all senators own real property 
worth at least $4,000 in the province for which they are appointed. The 
latter holding had one qualification.
32
 The Court held that fully repealing 
                                                                                                                                  
27  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at paras. 49-70. 
28  Id., at paras. 71-83. 
29  Id., at para. 77. 
30  Id., at paras. 95-110. 
31  Id., at paras. 87-90. 
32  Id., at paras. 91-94. 
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the real property requirement would have a unique impact on Quebec,
33
 
and therefore called for the consent of that province’s national assembly.34 
In the remainder of this paper, I explore how and when the structure 
of the Constitution matters, according to the Court in the Senate Reform 
Reference, in understanding and applying Part V. I focus primarily on the 
general interpretation of Part V rather than on the specifics of Senate 
reform. This inquiry treads some technical ground, but is not as dry as it 
sounds. Paying close attention to the meaning of Part V respects Part V’s 
status as an official mechanism for safeguarding Canada’s formal 
constitutional order against unchecked attempts at change.
35
 In the 
context of constitutional amendment, disputes over whose voice matters 
are deeply entrenched in Canada’s national psyche. They have been at 
the heart of some of Canada’s most polarizing constitutional cases36 and 
at the core of the political mêlée that gave rise to Part V. In this sense, the 
Part V procedures are a culmination of anxieties about Canada’s basic 
values of statecraft.
37
 They are a statement of the strength of Canada’s 
commitment to the laws and values that are constitutionally entrenched. 
The key task for the Court in the Senate Reform Reference was to 
measure that strength. 
It is particularly important to be attentive to the Court’s interpretation 
of Part V in the Senate Reform Reference. The Court’s reasons in this 
case are the most recent and comprehensive judicial interpretation of  
Part V. In the formal legal sphere, they are the authoritative statement on 
the meaning of Part V and can be formally changed only by subsequent 
                                                                                                                                  
33  Id., at paras. 91-94. 
34  Id., at paras. 93-94. Unlike any other province, Quebec is divided into senatorial districts 
and one senator must be appointed from each district: Constitution Act, 1867, s. 22. Under s. 23(6) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867, Quebec senators must either own real property worth at least $4,000 in 
the district for which they are appointed or live in that district. If the real property qualification set 
out in s. 23(3) is repealed, Quebec senators would have to live in the district for which they are 
appointed or risk running afoul of s. 23(6).  
35  When Part V was entrenched in 1982, it displaced the existing rules governing 
constitutional amendment and became the exclusive roadmap for formally amending the 
Constitution of Canada: Veto Reference, supra, note 25, at 806.  
36  See, e.g., the Upper House Reference, supra, note 25; Patriation Reference, supra, note 
25; Veto Reference, id.; Secession Reference, supra, note 2; and the recent Supreme Court Act 
Reference, supra, note 2. Each of these cases arose out of unilateral action to amend the Constitution 
by one order of government. 
37  John D. Whyte, “‘A Constitutional Conference…Shall Be Convened’: Living with 
Constitutional Promises” (1996) 8:1 Const. Forum Const. 15, at 15; Adam Dodek, “Amending the 
Constitution: The Real Question before the Supreme Court” (March/April 2014) Policy 35. 
(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) LESSONS FROM THE SENATE REFORM REFERENCE 229 
interpretations of the Court or the collective action of Parliament and all 
the provincial legislatures.
38
  
Finally, being attentive to constitutional structure is an affirmation of 
constitutional humility. When we examine the Constitution through an 
architectural lens, we abandon the fiction that constitutional meaning is 
found in the content of explicit language alone.
39
 We embrace the 
possibility that we cannot, and need not, explicitly capture in words the 
implicit values, tacit understandings and animating principles that 
underlie the Constitution.
40
 We come to appreciate the expressive 
character of structure.
41
 
                                                                                                                                  
38  Section 41(e) provides that an amendment in relation to Part V requires unanimous 
consent of Parliament and the provinces. 
39  The Court often reminds us that constitutional interpretation is an iterative process that 
must start and end with the text, but which must also account for the text’s linguistic, historical and 
philosophic context (see, e.g., Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 25 and the cases cited 
therein), as well as the unwritten assumptions and theories of which the written provisions are 
particular manifestations and the way that the provisions are intended to fit together: see, e.g., Senate 
Reform Reference, id., at para. 26; Remuneration Reference, supra, note 2; Secession Reference, 
supra, note 2. On this issue, see the Supreme Court’s comments on the place of democracy in the 
Constitution, at para. 62 of the Secession Reference:  
[T]he democracy principle can best be understood as a sort of baseline against which the 
framers of our Constitution, and subsequently, our elected representatives under it, have 
always operated. It is perhaps for this reason that the principle was not explicitly 
identified in the text of the Constitution Act, 1867 itself. To have done so might have 
appeared redundant, even silly, to the framers. … [T]his merely demonstrates the 
importance of underlying constitutional principles that are nowhere explicitly described 
in our constitutional texts. The representative and democratic nature of our political 
institutions was simply assumed. 
On this theme of finding meaning in the semiotic and formal dimensions of law, see, e.g., Gerald 
Postema, “Implicit Law” (1994) 13 Law & Phil. 361 and Roderick A Macdonald, “The Fridge-Door 
Statute” (2001) 47 McGill L.J. 11, at 29-38. 
40  For an example, see the Court’s explanation of why it was unnecessary for the framers of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 to “textually specify how the powers of the Senate relate to those of the 
House of Commons or how to resolve a deadlock between the two chambers”: Senate Reform 
Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 59. In short, the appointed status of senators, which is expressly 
provided for in the Constitution Act, 1867, was a textual manifestation of the framers’ intention that 
the Senate be complementary to the House of Commons rather than of equal authority. It was 
assumed that the absence of a popular mandate would prevent senators from overstepping their 
proper role in the constitutional order: Senate Reform Reference, id., at paras. 54-60.  
41  See, e.g., Walters, “Written and Unwritten”, supra, note 3, at 265ff.; Lon Fuller, The 
Anatomy of Law (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1968) [hereinafter “Fuller, Anatomy of Law”]; 
Laurence Tribe, The Invisible Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) [hereinafter 
“Tribe”]; Black, supra, note 3. The architecture of Canada’s Constitution is both constitutive of and 
constituted from a “blueprint for governance”: Wilkinson, supra, note 3. On assumptions about the 
privileged status of the written word in Anglo-American legal orthodoxy and about the content of 
the written word as definitive of law, see Roderick A. Macdonald, “Custom Made - For a Non-
Chirographic Critical Legal Pluralism” (2011) 26:2 C.J.L.S. 301 and Mark Greenberg, “The Moral 
Impact Theory of Law” (2014) 123:5 Yale L.J. 1118, respectively. 
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III. TRADITIONAL STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS AND PART V 
Structural analysis is a common interpretive technique in Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence. Traditional structural analysis rests on the 
premise that we can draw inferences about the meaning of the 
Constitution from the structures of government and institutional 
relationships that are created by, and reflected in, the Constitution.
42
 As 
the Court explained in its reasons in the Senate Reform Reference, 
traditional structural analysis is a necessary part of constitutional 
interpretation. The Constitution must be interpreted “by reference to the 
structure of the Constitution as a whole”, “with a view to discerning the 
structure of government that it seeks to implement”.43 
In past cases, structural inferences have sustained conclusions that, inter 
alia, the courts cannot enforce constitutional conventions,
44
 that the doctrine 
of interjurisdictional immunity should be deployed sparingly,
45
 and that the 
existence and essential characteristics of the Supreme Court of Canada are 
constitutionally entrenched.
46
 Moreover, structural inferences have been 
used to, among other things, interpret the Constitution,
47
 determine the scope 
of legislative action,
48
 delineate the division of powers,
49
 allocate 
                                                                                                                                  
42  See Walters, “Written and Unwritten”, supra, note 3; Elliot, supra, note 3; Demers, supra, 
note 3, at paras. 79-86. See also Black, id.; Bobbitt, supra, note 3; and Wilkinson, id., at 38. Ultimately, 
every judgment from a court is an implicit exercise of structural reasoning because it reflects a 
particular understanding of the institutional mandate of the courts. In some cases, structural reasoning 
on the role of the courts is made explicit. See, e.g., cases on the legitimacy of judicial review under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 
(S.C.C.); Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.); Sauvé v. Canada (Chief 
Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, 2002 SCC 68 (S.C.C.); cases on the Supreme Court’s reference 
jurisdiction and justiciability in reference cases: Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 6-31; 
Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 at 545 (S.C.C.); 
and cases on the interpretation of ss. 96 and 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867: Remuneration Reference, 
supra, note 2; Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2.  
43  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 26. 
44  See, e.g., Patriation Reference, supra, note 25. 
45  See e.g., Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 
2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]. 
46  See, e.g., Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2. 
47  Remuneration Reference, supra, note 2. 
48  Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] S.C.J. No. 125, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Hunt”]; Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.); Switzman v. 
Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.); OPSEU, supra, note 2.  
49  See, e.g., Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 45; Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 
S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Securities Reference”]. 
While the Court’s division of powers jurisprudence provides many examples of structural reasoning, 
it also shows that understandings of constitutional architecture change over time. Because both 
Canada’s constitutional text and its governing institutions have changed to accommodate social 
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constitutional remedies,
50
 ground substantive obligations for state actors,
51
 
determine the constitutional status of institutions,
52
 and support claims 
about what counts as an unwritten principle underlying the Constitution.
53
 
In light of this history, it may come as no surprise that in the Senate 
Reform Reference, the Court relied on traditional structural analysis to 
make sense of both the purpose and the particulars of Part V.
54
 Of 
particular relevance were the principle of federalism, in its distinctive 
Canadian iteration, and its consequences for provincial equality and 
intergovernmental comity.
55
 For the Court, these values provided a lens 
through which to see the formalities of Part V in the bigger constitutional 
picture. They revealed the animating spirit of Part V and helped to make 
sense of the individual amending formulae by unveiling the tensions and 
choices that gave rise to them.
56
  
                                                                                                             
realities, the inferences drawn therefrom must also change. For examples, see the discussion in  
R. Blake-Brown, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Judicial Legitimacy: The Rise and Fall of 
Chief Justice Lyman Poore Duff” (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 559 and Securities Reference, id., at paras. 54-62. 
According to Deschamps J., this evolution and the idiosyncrasies of judicial conceptions of 
federalism are cautionary tales for structural analysis: see Reference re Employment Insurance Act 
(Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669, at para. 10 (S.C.C.). Note, 
however, that Deschamps J.’s warning is itself an exercise in structural reasoning insofar as it is 
based on an understanding of the proper role of the courts.  
50  Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.). 
51  Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 52-54; Remuneration Reference, supra, note 2, 
at para. 104; Hunt, supra, note 48. 
52  Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2; OPSEU, supra, note 2. 
53  See, e.g., Secession Reference, supra, note 2; Remuneration Reference, supra, note 2; 
New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] S.C.J. 
No. 2, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “N.B. Broadcasting”].  
54  That the Court’s reasoning in the Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, was an 
exercise in structural analysis fits with the tradition of advisory opinions dealing with constitutional 
amendment over the past several decades — the Upper House Reference, supra, note 25, the 
Patriation Reference, supra, note 25, the Veto Reference, supra, note 25, the Secession Reference, 
supra, note 2 and the Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2. In each of these cases, the Court 
called on first principles of the constitutional order to answer controversial and unprecedented 
questions about the foundations of the Constitution and the procedure for constitutional change. 
55  For a discussion of the principle of intergovernmental comity, see Mark D. Walters, “The 
Constitutional Form and Reform of the Senate: Thoughts on the Constitutionality of Bill C-7” (2013) 
7 J.P.P.L. 37 [hereinafter “Walters, ‘Form and Reform’”]. 
56  Peter Oliver explains:  
The process of constitutional amendment provides important information about the 
political culture of a country. The discussion which preceded selection of the formula and 
the negotiations which accompany each attempt to use the formula once in place often 
expose the stress spots and irregularities in a country’s overall political structure. While 
the politics of constitution making and amending are very revealing, the amending 
formula itself is usually slightly unforthcoming … In Canada such is not and was never 
likely to be the case [given t]he federal nature of the country, the numerous differences 
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Before turning to some examples of how a traditional structural 
analysis played out in the Senate Reform Reference, it is important to 
note that in any invocation of (or attempt to avoid) Part V, the ultimate 
question is: which voices have a right to participate in the decision to 
amend the Constitution in a particular way? The traditional architectural 
version of this question is: Given the structure of government that the 
Constitution seeks to implement and the values that that structure 
embodies and constitutes, which levels of government, in which 
numbers, must consent to the proposed action before it comes into force? 
But, before answering any question about how Part V applies in a 
particular case, it will always be necessary to have a solid grasp on the 
meaning and operation of Part V as a whole. The architectural version of 
this inquiry is: Do the institutional structures and relationships created 
by, or reflected in, the Constitution assist in understanding Part V? And, 
if yes, how?  
It is also important to note that for the purposes of answering the 
reference questions, the relevant issue for the Court was never whether 
constitutional values or principles would be enhanced or diminished by 
the proposed reforms to the Senate. It was not relevant whether the 
Senate would be more or less democratic with term limits or more or less 
representative with consultative elections. While these are important 
issues for the public and our political representatives to consider when 
deciding how to reform the Senate, they were not relevant to the 
procedural questions before the Court.  
Now we can consider how traditional structural analysis can help us 
understand Part V and how it was and was not used by the Court in the 
Senate Reform Reference. For the Court, the principle of federalism was 
particularly helpful in ascribing meaning to Part V. According to the 
Court, the Part V amending procedures, both collectively and 
individually, reflect the principle that “constitutional change that engages 
provincial interests requires both the consent of Parliament and a 
significant degree of provincial consent”.57 In the spirit of cooperative 
                                                                                                             
between the provinces of the federation and the extended process of finding an 
appropriate amending formula …  
Peter Oliver, Patriation and Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
Oxford, 1992) [unpublished], at 180. 
57  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 29. 
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federalism,
58
 they “foster dialogue between the federal government and 
the provinces on matters of constitutional change”.59 Moreover, in the 
spirit of facilitating dialogue, they consecrate the constitutional equality 
of the provinces such that “no province stands above the others with 
respect to constitutional amendments, and all provinces are given the 
same rights in the process of amendment”.60  
The Court identifies the principled basis of some of the amending 
procedures within Part V, each of which is a manifestation of the 
demands of Canada’s brand of federalism. The general amending 
formula reflects the principle that “substantial provincial consent must be 
obtained for constitutional change that engages provincial interests”.61 
The unanimous consent procedure is driven by the aim to grant to each 
of the partners in Canada’s confederation a veto over amendments 
dealing with matters that are “the most essential to the survival of the 
state”.62 And the unilateral amending procedures embody the principle 
that “[n]either level of government acting alone can alter the fundamental 
nature and role of the institutions provided for in the Constitution”.63 
It is unsurprising that federalism plays such a prominent role in the 
Court’s analysis in the Senate Reform Reference. Federalism is inherent 
in the structure of the Canadian Constitution and has been the “lodestar” 
guiding judicial interpretation of the Constitution from the beginning.
64
 
Moreover, at the heart of the issues in the Senate Reform Reference is the 
question of how to manage the relationship between the provincial and 
federal governments in moments of constitutional change. The question 
is always, how can the dynamism of constitutional crystallization and 
evolution be reconciled with an agreement between the provincial and 
federal governments to amend the Constitution only by virtue of 
prescribed procedures?  
But while federalism is the principle that gained the most traction with 
the Court in the Senate Reform Reference, other constitutional principles 
also helped to limit the range of possible interpretations of Part V. 
                                                                                                                                  
58  On the cooperative and non-hierarchical nature of Canadian federalism today, see,  
e.g., Securities Reference, supra, note 49, at para. 71; Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 45,  
at paras. 21-24; Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 55-60. 
59  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 31. 
60  Id., at para. 31. 
61  Id., at para. 34. 
62  Id., at para. 41, citing B. Pelletier, La modification constitutionelle au Canada 
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1996), at 208 [hereinafter “Pelletier”].  
63  Senate Reform Reference, id., at para. 48. 
64  Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 56. 
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For example, Part V makes sense within a constitutional arrangement that 
attempts to balance the demands of democracy and federalism.
65
 On the 
one hand, democracy calls for a mechanism by which the Constitution can 
evolve through a consensus of the Canadian people, as represented by their 
elected officials. On the other, federalism justifies the expectation that the 
Constitution will be subject to change only when the coordinate authority 
of the provincial and federal legislatures is respected. To achieve this 
balance, Part V entrenches the right of the House of Commons, the Senate 
and the provincial legislatures to initiate negotiations for constitutional 
change (section 46(1)) and the obligation of each of the federal and 
provincial governments to come to the negotiating table following 
“democratic expressions of a desire for change”.66 Moreover, it entrenches 
the principle that any matter “indivisibly related to the implementation of 
the federal principle or to a fundamental term or condition of the union”67 
can be amended only with the consent of some configuration of Parliament 
and the provincial legislatures. At the same time, in the spirit of the 
bicameral form of democratic government in Canada, Part V entrenches a 
procedure whereby both legislative houses review constitutional 
amendments and must consent to them, except in specified circumstances 
where the elected representatives of the House of Commons can override 
the absence of consent from the Senate (section 47(1)).  
As a second example, Part V is an expression of the rule of law, 
constitutionalism and the protection of minorities.
68
 Part V establishes 
thresholds of consent that must be met in order for the Constitution to be 
formally changed and identifies the types of amendments subject to each 
                                                                                                                                  
65  On balancing the demands of federalism and democracy, see id. 
66  Id., at para. 69. 
67  OPSEU, supra, note 2, at 40. 
68  Constitution Act, 1982, supra, note 11, ss. 38, 41, 42, 43, 47, 52(3); Secession 
Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 72-78. The Supreme Court has held that, “[b]y requiring 
broad support in the form of an ‘enhanced majority’ to achieve constitutional change, the 
Constitution ensures that minority interests must be addressed before proposed changes which 
would affect them may be enacted.” Id., at para. 77. However, whether Part V protects 
minority interests is questionable. The bilateral and multilateral amending procedures shield 
fundamental constitutional values from unilateral majority action. But they do not protect 
against concerted action by majorities across jurisdictions. Moreover,  s. 35.1 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 provides that representatives of Aboriginal peoples will be invited to 
discuss any amendment to s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 or s. 25 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982 before the amendment is entrenched. However, s. 35.1 does not offer anything 
beyond an invitation to the table. At the hearing of the Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, 
the issue of participation by Aboriginal people in the amending procedure was raised 
repeatedly.  
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threshold. By doing so expressly and by requiring a measure of 
transparency in the final stages of constitutional amendment, the 
provisions of Part V are part of the orderly, stable, enduring and 
predictable framework of social life and political decision-making that a 
constitution shaped by the rule of law and constitutionalism should strive 
to achieve.
69
 Of course, the nature of the amending procedure, along with 
the Court’s understanding of how the Constitution evolves over time, 
ensures that any promise of predictability attached to Part V is not 
absolute. Uncertainty is inevitable when the governing amending 
procedure sets thresholds of consent defined by subject matter, all of 
which are laden with political histories and are subject to interpretation. 
Uncertainty is further inevitable when the scope of what is entrenched 
within the Constitution is in perpetual flux and the processes of 
entrenchment are multiple and still coming to light.
70
  
The Court’s use of traditional structural reasoning when trying to 
make sense of Part V helps to ensure that the “Procedure for Amending 
[the] Constitution of Canada” is a functioning part of a larger 
constitutional scheme. Moreover, it facilitates an interpretation of Part V 
that both reflects and perpetuates the distinctive vision of government 
embodied and evolving in the Constitution as a whole. That the Court 
attributed particular interpretive force to the principle of federalism in 
order to constrain the range of possible meanings of Part V is consistent 
not only with federalism’s prominence in Canada’s constitutional history, 
but also with the nature of the constitutional principles generally. These 
principles are the implicit assumptions that make sense of the text.
71
 
They are inherent in Canada’s constitutional arrangements,72 as they 
represent the “fundamental norms so basic” that they are part of the legal 
structure of governance in Canada.
73
  
                                                                                                                                  
69  Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 70, 78. As the Court explained at para. 31 of 
the Senate Reform Reference, id., the Part V amending formulas are “designed … to protect 
Canada’s constitutional status quo until such time as reforms are agreed upon”. 
70  On entrenchment, see Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 76-106. 
71  Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 49-53, 148.  
72  Id., at para. 50. 
73  Beverley McLachlin, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is Going On?” (2006) 4 
N.Z.L.J. 147, at 148. The principles, while said by some to be so “unremarkable” as to be “trite” 
(Justice Ian Binnie, “Justice Charles Gonthier and the Unwritten Principles of the Constitution” in 
Michel Morin, Responsibility, Fraternity and Sustainability in Law: In Memory of the Honourable 
Charles Doherty Gonthier (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2012) 441, at 442) and 
“fundamental” by others (McLachlin, id., at 148), have been controversial for many. Critics denounce 
the principles as improper judicial amendments to the Constitution and challenge the “hard” use of the 
principles to strike down legislation or impose legal obligations not otherwise anchored in constitutional 
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It follows from the status of the constitutional principles that every 
exercise of constitutional interpretation must bring the principles to life in 
ways that are consistent with a deep understanding of the text, subtext and 
context of the Constitution. This is structural analysis at work. Such an 
approach does not endorse stretching or ignoring the constitutional text; 
rather, it calls for interpreting the text in a way that is true to the theories 
on which the text is based. On the flip side, it means that any interpretation 
of the Constitution that is inconsistent with the collection of constitutional 
values and principles writ large is antithetical to the existing constitutional 
order.
74
 Since the principles are “implicit in the very nature of a 
Constitution”,75 if we interpret the Constitution in a way that is contrary to 
them, we will have abandoned the current constitutional arrangement in 
favour of a radically different configuration of governance. 
But while the reasoning in the Senate Reform Reference is in many 
ways an exercise in traditional structural reasoning, the Court’s 
willingness to rely on structure was not without its limits. On the one 
hand, the Court ascribed interpretive force to architectural concerns in 
order to both reject the formalist trope of textualism and to read the 
Constitution’s explicit text both up and down. The Court read up in its 
interpretation of sections 24 and 32 of the Constitution Act, 1867, both of 
which provide for the appointment of senators. The Court reasoned that 
behind the language of senatorial appointment in sections 24 and 32 was 
a grander vision of the Senate as the House of Commons’ 
complementary, sober-thinking, independent legislative counterpart.
76
 
The Court read down in its interpretation of section 44 in relation to 
section 42.
77
 In essence, the Court held:  
                                                                                                             
text. The Secession Reference, supra, note 2 and the Remuneration Reference, supra, note 2, have been 
particularly controversial. Critics fear that such unwritten principles, with their Dworkinian generality 
and flexibility, give judges too much leeway to decide cases according to, at worst, their whims and, at 
best, unpredictable interpretations of abstract concepts. The “weak” interpretive use of the principles 
has been more palatable: see, e.g., Elliot, supra, note 3; Binnie, id.; Tsvi Kahana, “Canada” in Dawn 
Oliver & Carlo Fusaro, eds., How Constitutions Change: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011) 9 [hereinafter “Kahana”]. 
74  This is not to say that the meaning of the unwritten constitutional principles is frozen in time. 
The principles evolve just as the limbs of the living tree grow. Consider, e.g., the changes to Canada’s 
brand of federalism and democracy since Confederation (regarding federalism, see supra, note 49; 
regarding democracy, see, e.g., Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 61-69; for an account of a 
specific example, see, e.g., Robert J. Sharpe & Patricia I. McMahon, The Persons Case: The Origins and 
Legacy of the Right for Legal Personhood (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007)).  
75  Secession Reference, id., at para. 50. 
76  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at paras. 54-63.  
77  Id., at paras. 72-77. 
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The Senate is a core component of the Canadian federal structure of 
government. As such, changes that affect its fundamental nature and 
role engage the interests of the stakeholders in our constitutional design 
— i.e. the federal government and the provinces — and cannot be 
achieved by Parliament acting alone.
78
 
On the other hand, the Court showed that structural concerns must be 
tempered by other interpretive factors. It was unwilling to read words or 
principles into the Constitution on structural grounds without an explicit 
textual hook. For example, one reading of Part V that privileges 
traditional structural concerns provides that the threshold of consensus 
required to amend the Constitution should increase in proportion to the 
significance of the amendments in question. In the context of Senate 
reform, this would entail that significant constitutional amendments to 
the Senate — a national institution in which the provinces necessarily 
have an interest
79
 — require a commensurate degree of consensus 
between federal and provincial authorities. On this reading, constitutional 
amendments that alter the fundamental institutional architecture of the 
Constitution of Canada, like abolition of the Senate, would automatically 
warrant unanimous consent of all parties to the federation. Moreover, 
amendments in relation to the Senate in which all the provinces had an 
equal interest would fall within the 7/50 rule, without the possibility of 
provinces opting out (section 42(1)). All other amendments in relation to 
the Senate would be accomplished by Parliament acting unilaterally 
(section 44) or bilaterally (section 45).  
The Supreme Court’s reading of Part V does not go this far. It did not 
accept a reading of Part V that would expand the scope of sections 41 
and 42 beyond the subject matters expressly listed. We see this in the 
Court’s holding that the abolition of the Senate requires unanimous 
consent of Parliament and the provinces. The Court reached this 
conclusion not because abolition would fundamentally alter the 
foundational architecture of the Constitution as imagined in 1867, but 
rather because abolition would rearrange the structure of the Part V 
amendment process agreed to in 1982.
80
  
                                                                                                                                  
78  Id., at para. 77. 
79  As the Court explained in the Senate Reform Reference, id., at para. 77: “The Senate is a 
core component of the Canadian federal structure of government. As such, changes that affect its 
fundamental nature and role engage the interests of the stakeholders in our constitutional design — i.e. 
the federal government and the provinces — and cannot be achieved by Parliament acting alone.” 
80  Senate Reform Reference, id., at paras. 103-110. We see another example in the Court’s 
conclusion that the government’s proposal to impose term limits on senators fell under the general 
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IV. THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF PART V 
Whereas the preceding section dealt with structural interpretation in 
the traditional sense, this section asks whether the internal, formal or 
“codal” structure of Part V has interpretive force.81 Like above, the 
answer according to the Senate Reform Reference is “sort of” and that 
“sort of” is constrained within narrow limits. 
“Formal structure” refers to the scope of each provision of Part V 
and of Part V as a whole, as well as the way that they are presented and 
configured. If we pay attention to internal structure, we see that the 
formal dimensions of Part V extend an implicit “interpretive invitation”82 
to readers of the Constitution and “ordain … modes of intelligible 
analysis” for thinking about constitutional amendment.83 We accept that 
we can garner a “truer sense”84 of the meaning and operation of Part V 
by closely examining the assumptions embedded within the form, style, 
language and arrangement of its provisions, and of the provisions in 
relation to each other. Ultimately, we affirm that the meaning of Part V is 
greater than the sum of the words on the page, it is a function of the 
means and the ends of constitutional expression.
85
 
In addition, paying attention to the formal structure of Part V is a 
reminder that Part V is articulated and presented in a particular way for 
particular reasons. The framers were not bound to any particular 
                                                                                                             
amending procedure via s. 38 rather than s. 42(1): Senate Reform Reference, id., at paras. 74-83. While 
the Court held that all changes to the fundamental nature and role of the Senate could not be achieved 
unilaterally (Senate Reform Reference, id., at paras. 74-77) it was unwilling to locate all such changes 
(for which it might be important to have uniform application to the provinces) in s. 42(1) where the 
provincial opt-out is unavailable, instead of s. 38(1) (Senate Reform Reference, id., at para. 83). 
81  In referring to this structural context as “codal”, I am not claiming that Part V should be 
interpreted akin to a tax code or that Part V is a civil code of sorts. Rather, I use the term “codal” in 
part as a matter of convenience. It creates a helpful shorthand for distinguishing this type of 
structural analysis from its traditional counterpart discussed in Part III, above. But I also use the term 
as a matter of substance. The reference to Part V’s “codal” structure signifies that some techniques 
and assumptions of codal interpretation in civil law can contribute to the exercise of interpreting Part 
V. For a treatise on codal interpretation, see, e.g., John E.C. Brierley & Roderick A. Macdonald, 
eds., Quebec Civil Law: An Introduction to Quebec Private Law (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 
1993) [hereinafter “Brierley & Macdonald”], esp at Ch. IV. Note that relying on internal structure as 
part of a complete interpretation is not limited to Part V (see, e.g., the reasoning of Lamer C.J.C. in 
Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 3, at 499-513, esp. 500-504 and 511-13). 
82  Brierley & Macdonald, id., at 104. 
83  Id., at 100. 
84  Demers, supra, note 3, at para. 86. 
85  On this relationship between means and ends, see Lon L. Fuller, “Means and Ends” in 
Kenneth I. Winston, The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller, rev. ed. 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 61 [hereinafter “Fuller, ‘Means and Ends’”]. 
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procedure of constitutional amendment or any particular presentation of 
that procedure. They made choices from a range of possibilities.
86
 As a 
result, the form and style of the amending procedures are, like the 
substance of Part V, idiosyncratic — the culmination of Canada’s 
constitutional history, assumptions about the nature of the Canadian 
constitution and choices about how it should be changed. The procedures 
and disputes it generates are different from those that would arise if other 
choices had been made. An interpretation of Part V that is attentive to 
internal structure would account for the normative force of these choices. 
Moreover, interpreting Part V with reference to its formal or codal 
structure shows respect for the principle of constitutional integrity.
87
 It is 
consistent with the well-established belief that the Constitution of 
Canada is “a single entity”,88 with individual parts that, in all their 
“diversity and complexity”, are linked89 and cannot trump each other.90 
On such a reading, the rules governing formal constitutional amendment 
would be interpreted with an appreciation of that which is subject to 
amendment. The interpreter would accept the premise that a 
constitutional amending procedure only makes sense in relation to the 
constitution that is to be amended. Similarly, each rule governing 
constitutional amendment would be interpreted alongside the other rules 
for amendment. As the Court noted in the Senate Reform Reference, “the 
manner in which the constitutional provisions are intended to interact 
with one another must inform our interpretation, understanding, and 
application of the text”.91 
In order to get a better sense of how internal structure can inform a 
contextual interpretation of Part V and help to demystify some of the 
                                                                                                                                  
86  A comparative approach is a good reminder that Part V is the product of choice. Compare 
Part V to, for example, U.S. Const., art. V; the Constitution of India, art. 368; Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act, 63 & 64 Vict, c. 12, s. 128; and the Constitution of Ireland, 1997, art. 46. 
Compare too all of the uncodified rules, principles and conventions of constitutional amendment. 
87  It may be that the principle of constitutional integrity is a free-standing unwritten 
principle of the Constitution (Elliot, supra, note 3, at 137-38) or flows from the principle of 
constitutionalism (Walters, “Form and Reform”, supra, note 55, at 57).  
88  Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 32, 49-51, 148-150; Québec (Commission 
des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Communauté urbaine de Montréal, [2004] 
S.C.J. No. 25, 2004 SCC 30, at para. 16, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 789 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Québec 
Commission des droits”].  
89  Secession Reference, id., at paras. 50, 48; Québec Commission des droits, id., at para. 16. 
90  Reference re Bill 30, An Act to amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (S.C.C.); N.B. Broadcasting, supra, note 53; Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. 
No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.). 
91  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 26. 
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technicalities of the amending procedures, consider two examples. First, 
the formal structure of Part V suggests that Part V was designed to be a 
coherent and complete code of constitutional procedure.
92
 We see this in 
the way that the multiple amending formulas fit together as a series of 
exceptions to a residual general rule. The Court adopted this reading of 
Part V in the Senate Reform Reference.
93
 As the Court explained, section 38 
is “the procedure of general application for amendments to the Constitution 
of Canada”.94 It “represents the balance deemed appropriate by the framers 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 for most constitutional amendments, apart 
from those contemplated in one of the other provisions in Part V”.95 In this 
sense, section 38 is residual. When an amendment is plugged into the Part V 
algorithm and does not trigger any of the exceptions, the general rule 
applies.
96
 Accordingly, Part V governs all possible formal amendments  
to the Constitution of Canada. No formal amendment can fall outside  
the scheme.
97
  
Second, the formal structure of Part V could support the claim that 
each amending procedure within Part V has a principled basis. This 
principled basis would emerge from, and “define the range of meaning” 
of, the procedure as a whole and each subject matter listed within it.
98
 As 
discussed above, in the Senate Reform Reference, the Court accepted that 
each amending procedure was animated by a particular principle. For 
example, section 41, the unanimity formula, was designed to apply to 
                                                                                                                                  
92  In the Veto Reference, supra, note 25, at 806, the Court noted that Part V was a complete 
code governing constitutional amendment. 
93  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at paras. 32, 36. Note that the Court referred 
only to exceptions to the general rule, not variations. It held that s. 42 is complementary to s. 38(1) 
because the section identifies certain categories of amendments that are subject to the 7/50 rule. 
Section 42 could also be called a “variation” of the general rule, given that it identifies certain 
subject matters, amendments in relation to which trigger the general amending procedure but not the 
provincial opt-out contemplated in s. 38(3). Moreover, the Court does not include s. 47(1) in its 
review of the amending procedures. Section 47(1) could also be called a variation because it 
provides that in certain circumstances, an “amendment to the Constitution of Canada made by 
proclamation under section 38, 41, 42 or 43 may be made without a resolution of the Senate 
authorizing the issue of the proclamation”.  
94  Senate Reform Reference, id., at para. 36. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. When the individual procedures are taken together, we can see that the provisions of 
Part V are arranged in a cascading scheme, establishing an algorithm of sorts. At the top of the 
scheme is s. 41, which represents the most onerous burden for formal amendment — unanimity. At 
the bottom is the residual procedure set out in s. 38(1), which is triggered in the absence of any other 
applicable formula. Between the top and the bottom is a sequence of exceptions. 
97  This is consistent with s. 52(3), which provides that amendments to the Constitution of 
Canada “shall be made only in accordance with the authority contained in the Constitution of Canada”. 
98  Brierley & Macdonald, supra, note 81, at 104. 
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“certain fundamental changes to the Constitution of Canada”.99 In the 
Court’s view, unanimity is required for fundamental changes because 
each party to the federal compromise is entitled to a veto on the “most 
essential” matters.100  
For the purposes of the Senate Reform Reference, the Court sought 
no further elaboration of the principled basis of section 41. It did not 
need it. Undoubtedly, the individual matters listed in section 41 are, as 
the Court suggested, all issues that are central to the conception and 
preservation of the Canadian state. But, looking deeper, these matters are 
also linked because they all engage the federalism principle (thereby 
requiring a meaningful level of consent by both Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures) while simultaneously being of unique interest to 
one or some provinces (thereby warranting a veto for those provinces).
101
 
For example, the Senate floor rule is of special concern to provinces with 
small and/or declining populations whose Senate seats would otherwise 
outnumber their representation in the House of Commons. By virtue of 
section 41(b), these smaller provinces are guaranteed a veto over 
amendments that alter their minimum level of political representation. 
Similarly, section 41(c) requires unanimous consent for amendments in 
                                                                                                                                  
99  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 41. 
100  Id., at para. 41, citing Pelletier, supra, note 62. 
101  See Constitution Act, 1982, s. 41(b), (c), (d). Similar results could flow from the internal 
structure of s. 42(1). Section 42 is a particularization of and a “complement” to the general s. 38 
rule: Senate Reform Reference, id., at para. 37. It establishes a class of amendments that are subject 
to the 7/50 threshold of consent set out in s. 38(1) but not the “supermajority” requirement or the 
provincial opt-out scheme in s. 38(2) to (4). Again, the matters listed in s. 42(1) could be thought of 
as random or as a reaction to the Upper House Reference, supra, note 25. But, taken together, the 
matters support an argument that s. 42 applies to amendments that are “indivisibly related to the 
implementation of the federal principle” (OPSEU, supra, note 2, at 40) and amendments to essential 
features of national institutions that engage the interests of the provinces fully but equally. These 
types of amendments are properly subject to the 7/50 threshold because they require the consensus 
of a majority of the provinces but not any particular province. At the same time, they are properly 
particularized outside of s. 38(1) because, given the interests at stake, it is neither feasible nor 
principled to permit some provinces to “opt out” of amendments in relation to the features of 
national institutions. In the Senate Reform Reference, id., the Court affirmed these dimensions of  
s. 42(1) (see paras. 37-38) but rejected the idea that any principle underlying s. 42 would justify 
applying s. 42 to an amendment that did not fall squarely within the language of the matters 
expressly listed in s. 42(1)(a)-(e) (see paras. 74, 83). This is true to the constitutional text and 
understandings of the legitimacy of the Court’s role (see, e.g., para. 64). The risk is that in future 
cases, amendments touching on national institutions that fall within s. 38(1) could also trigger the 
opt-out provision in s. 38(3). This would be the case if, for instance, the Constitution were amended 
in the future such that provinces could both hold consultative elections for senatorial nominees and 
vote on how long their senators should sit for. Any subsequent amendment to this latter provision 
could, if it fell within s. 38(1), also trigger the opt-out in s. 38(3).  
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relation to the use of English or French. This protects the interests of 
linguistic minorities against national majorities.
102
 Moreover, section 41(d) 
requires unanimous consent for amendments in relation to the “composition 
of the Supreme Court of Canada”. The Court explained the reasoning behind 
this decision in the Supreme Court Act Reference:  
… the central bargain that led to the creation of the Supreme Court in 
the first place was the guarantee that a significant proportion of the 
judges would be drawn from institutions linked to Quebec civil law and 
culture. … Requiring unanimity for changes to the composition of the 
Court gave Quebec constitutional assurance that changes to its 
representation on the Court would not be effected without its consent. 
Protecting the composition of the Court under s. 41(d) was necessary 
because leaving its protection to s. 42(1)(d) would have left open the 
possibility that Quebec’s seats on the Court could have been reduced 
or altogether removed without Quebec’s agreement.103 
The virtue of locating a principled basis within the individual matters 
listed in each amending procedure is that it would carve out a defined 
scope for each procedure vis-à-vis the other procedures. In addition, it 
would offer interpretive guidance on the meaning of the individual 
matters listed within each provision of Part V. Moreover, it would 
support an interpretation of each amending procedure that both endures 
over time and provides guidance in particular cases.
104
 In this way, 
locating the principled basis of each amending procedure would assist in 
matching an amendment to an appropriate amending procedure 
according to the significance of the proposed change — an assessment 
that persists over time even as reform agendas evolve — rather than on a 
strict adherence to the text of the listed matters. 
In the Senate Reform Reference, the Court’s attribution of 
interpretive force to the formal structure of Part V did not go this far. On 
the one hand, the Court’s reasons suggest that it is important to identify 
the principled basis of each amending procedure in order to distinguish 
                                                                                                                                  
102  Section 41(c) is subject to the special arrangements procedure set out in s. 43.  
103  Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 93 (emphasis added). 
104  This result corresponds to an assumption embedded within codal structure and 
interpretation, namely, that rules can be meaningfully expressed with a degree of generality to ensure 
stability and permanence, a degree of flexibility to establish baselines for individual action and a 
sufficient degree of specificity to convey the limits of the rule in future cases: Brierley & 
Macdonald, supra, note 81, at 99, 100.  
(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) LESSONS FROM THE SENATE REFORM REFERENCE 243 
one procedure from another.
105
 But, on the other hand, as with traditional 
structural analysis, the Court was not willing to rely on formal structural 
concerns to read language into Part V that did not otherwise have an 
explicit textual basis. For example, consider again the issue of abolishing 
the Senate. If we truly accepted the notion that the level of federal and 
provincial consensus on formal constitutional amendments should 
increase in proportion to the significance of the modifications in 
question, then categorizing a proposal for abolition on the basis of its 
effect on the amending procedures, as the Court did,
106
 would be 
unsatisfying. It would not do justice to the revolutionary effect that 
abolition of the Senate would have on Canada’s constitutional 
architecture.
107
 The more satisfying conclusion would be that abolition 
should attract unanimous consent because of its significance rather than 
because of its effect on the Part V amending formula.
108
 This conclusion 
would be reinforced if we imagine proposals to dismantle institutions of 
governance that are not specifically mentioned in Part V, such as the 
superior courts. If significance were the test, the constitutional 
renovation that would flow from abolishing the superior courts would 
                                                                                                                                  
105  See, e.g., Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 75. See also paras. 48, 68-69, 
71-83, and 87-94 generally.  
106  Id., at paras. 103-110. 
107  See the Court’s description of the Senate as a “core component of the Canadian federal 
structure”, id., at para. 77. In short, abolition would replace the “bicameral form of government that 
gives shape to the Constitution Act, 1867” with a unicameral alternative (id., at para. 97; see also 
paras. 14-19). This is a profound reimagination of Canada’s constitutional order and the system of 
government it seeks to implement. It would necessarily entail dramatic reallocations of constitutional 
authority and responsibility between new or existing constitutional actors.  
108  It could be argued that classifying a proposal to abolish the Senate under s. 41(e) runs 
afoul of the Court’s mantra in the Senate Reform Reference, id., that the process of constitutional 
amendment cannot favour form over substance. This argument is unlikely to hold water given that 
the Court’s mantra only goes so far as to favour substantive rather than formal readings of the words 
expressly on the constitutional page. Even this reading of the mantra pushes up against the Court’s 
statement, albeit in obiter, in the Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 91, that a 
proposal to abolish the Supreme Court would warrant unanimous consent under s. 41(d) because 
abolition would wipe out the Court’s composition. As with abolition of the Senate, the Court’s 
conclusion does not do justice to the profound constitutional transformation that would result from 
abolition of the Supreme Court. At the same time, it sits uncomfortably with the core of the Court’s 
analysis in the Supreme Court Act Reference, which turned on the revelation that the Supreme Court 
is an entrenched and “essential part of Canada’s constitutional architecture” (at para. 100). 
Moreover, the Court’s conclusion that abolition of the Supreme Court falls within s. 41(d) is 
inconsistent with its subsequent holding that abolition of the Senate could not fall within s. 42(1)(b) 
or (c) because these provisions contemplate the continued existence of the Senate: Senate Reform 
Reference, at para. 99. It is not obvious why the same reasoning does not exclude abolition of the 
Court from the scope of the Court’s “composition” in s. 41(d).  
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merit the highest level of constitutional consensus regardless of the fact 
that it is not expressly listed in section 41. 
Ultimately, even though the Court accepted that the purpose of the 
unanimity threshold is to ensure that each partner to Canada’s federal 
compromise has a veto on the topics “most essential to the survival of the 
state”,109 the Court also makes clear that significance is not the 
determinative factor when allocating proposed constitutional 
amendments to the amending formulas. As the Court explained, the 7/50 
rule “represents the balance deemed appropriate by the framers of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 for most constitutional amendments, apart from 
those contemplated in one of the other provisions of Part V”.110 In other 
words, constitutional text trumps qualitative measures of significance. 
V. THE ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE OF PART V 
The two preceding sections deal with constitutional structure 
primarily as an interpretive tool. In both, the question was how the 
architecture of the Constitution informs our understanding of the 
constitutional amending procedures. In this section, the focus shifts to 
how the Constitution is constitutive of analytical architecture. The claim 
is that the logic and structure of Part V give rise to a two-stage analytical 
framework for determining which amending procedure, if any, applies in 
particular cases.  
1.  The “Constitution of Canada” and Its Amendments 
Before turning to the analytical framework of Part V, let me briefly 
review the scope of the “Constitution of Canada” and the ways in which 
the Constitution can change. As is discussed below, these two issues are 
central to understanding the application of Part V. 
The “Constitution of Canada” “includes” 30 texts listed in the 
Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, along with their amendments.
111
 
Yet these texts are not exhaustive. In the Senate Reform Reference, the 
Court repeated what it has said many times before, namely, that the 
                                                                                                                                  
109  Senate Reform Reference, id., at para. 41. 
110  Id., at para. 36.  
111  Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(2). The list of texts in s. 52(2) may not be complete. In the 
Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2, the Court held that ss. 4(1), 5 and 6 of the Supreme 
Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, are constitutionally codified.  
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Constitution is an exhaustive yet flexible framework of rules and 
principles that shape Canada’s system of government and reflect the 
aspirations of the citizenry.
112
 The Constitution is not a list of texts, but 
rather is an aggregate of intersecting pieces that “defines the powers of 
the constituent elements of Canada’s system of government” and 
“governs the state’s relationship with the individual”.113 The various parts 
of the Constitution are written and unwritten,
114
 legal and political,
115
 
entrenched and unentrenched,
116
 formal and informal,
117
 implicit and 
explicit,
118
 and small “c” constitutional and big “C” Constitutional.119 
                                                                                                                                  
112  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 23; Secession Reference, supra, note 2, 
at para. 32; OPSEU, supra, note 2; N.B. Broadcasting, supra, note 53. 
113  Senate Reform Reference, id., at para. 23. See also Patriation Reference, supra, note 25, 
at 876-84. 
114  Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 32; Remuneration Reference, supra, note 2, at 
para. 92. Written parts of the Constitution of Canada include the texts listed in s. 52(2) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, orders in council, “ordinary” statutes that bear on the organs of government, 
common law rules found in judicial decisions, conventions that are reduced to writing in some form: 
OPSEU, supra, note 2; Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1991] S.C.J. No. 45, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 
69 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Osborne”]; Patriation Reference, id., at 876-77, 880. Unwritten elements 
include the “unwritten principles”, constitutional architecture, constitutional conventions, custom, 
practice, performance, and so on: Patriation Reference, id., at 879-80; Secession Reference, id.; 
Senate Reform Reference, id., at para. 27.  
115  According to the Supreme Court, the “total constitution of the country” equals 
“constitutional conventions plus constitutional law”: Patriation Reference, id., at 884; Osborne, id. 
Constitutional conventions, along with the workings of Parliament, are part of the political 
constitution: Secession Reference, id., at para. 32. They are not enforceable by the courts: Patriation 
Reference, id., at 877-81. Constitutional law is found in the texts listed in s. 52(2) (as interpreted and 
amended), unwritten constitutional principles, statutes and common law rules and decisions: 
Patriation Reference, id., at 877; Osborne, id.  
116  The entrenched parts of the Constitution are the “supreme law of Canada” and set the 
standard to which all other valid laws must comply: Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(2). The 
unentrenched parts of the Constitution are those that contribute to the constitutional apparatus, but 
are neither supreme nor protected by special rules for amendment. They include the elements of the 
political constitution, as well as statutes and the common law that crystallize constitutional 
conventions or bear on the operation of organs of government (Patriation Reference, id.; Secession 
Reference, id., at para. 32; Osborne, id., at 86-88; Ontario English Teachers’ Assn v. Ontario 
(Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470, at paras. 63-64 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Ontario Teachers”]).  
117  For different possible approaches to distinguishing the formal and informal elements of 
the Constitution, see, e.g., Kahana, supra, note 73, at 11-14; Larry D. Kramer, “Undercover Anti-
Populism” (2004) 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1343; Roderick A. Macdonald, “Pluralistic Human Rights? 
Universal Human Wrongs?” in R. Provost & C. Sheppard, eds., Dialogues on Human Rights and 
Legal Pluralism (Dordrecht: Springer Press, 2012) 15. 
118  This binary captures four types of constitutional norms and institutions — those that are 
explicit and canonical, implicit and canonical, explicit and inferential, and implicit and inferential. 
For an account of these typologies not restricted to the constitutional context, see R.A. Macdonald, 
“Pour la reconnaissance d’une normativité implicite et inférentielle” (1986) XVIII Sociologie et 
sociétés 47; R.A. Macdonald, “Les Vielles Gardes. Hypothèses sue l’émergence des normes, 
 
246 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Canada’s Constitution is a living tree,120 the flowing sap of which 
fends off the petrification of originalism. The living tree metaphor 
anchors the principle that the Constitution should be interpreted in a way 
that “accommodates and addresses” the evolving realities of modern 
life.
121
 Moreover, it is a reminder that constitutional change is not a 
monopoly of the formalities of Part V. Rather, the Constitution changes 
through a variety of informal and formal means, including judicial 
action,
122
 individual interaction, political practice,
123
 international 
agreement,
124
 custom and attitudes, evolving institutional roles and 
functions over time,
125
 execution of policy by the civil service, 
administrative and bureaucratic conduct, legislative enactment and 
reform,
126
 technological developments, and so on. 
2.  The Analytical Framework  
The Senate Reform Reference is not the first time the Court has been 
asked to advise on the proper procedure for Senate reform. In the Upper 
House Reference (1980), the Court concluded that Parliament could not 
                                                                                                             
l’internormativité et le désordre à travers des institutions normatives” in J.-G. Belley, ed., Le droit 
soluble. Contributions québécoises à l’étude internormativité (Paris: Librarie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1996) 233. See also Tribe, supra, note 41; Fuller, Anatomy of Law, supra, note 41; 
Roderick A. Macdonald, “The Design of Constitutions to Accommodate Linguistic, Cultural and 
Ethnic Diversity: The Canadian Experiment” in K. Kulcsar & D. Szabo, eds., Dual Images: 
Multiculturalism on Two Sides of the Atlantic (Budapest: Royal Society of Canada – Hungary 
Academy of Sciences, 1996) 52.  
119  Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Constitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1950), at 3-23 [hereinafter “Gérin-Lajoie”]. Gérin-Lajoie defines the “small “c” constitution” 
as the full body of basic (legal and political) rules governing state organization and activities, and the 
“big “C” Constitution” as the constitution that embodies the most “fundamental law” of the 
Constitution, as is captured in written text and which should be subject to higher thresholds for 
amendment.  
120  Edwards, supra, note 8, at 136. 
121  Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79,  
at para. 22 (S.C.C.).  
122  See Gérin-Lajoie, supra, note 119, at 31-32. Some distinguish between judicial 
pronouncements of what the Constitution is (i.e., interpretation) from judicial pronouncements of 
what the Constitution implies (i.e., norm creation), with the latter amounting to formal (but 
improper) constitutional amendment: see, e.g., Kahana, supra, note 73, at 33-39. 
123  Consider the decision of the federal Liberal Party to expel all senators from the Liberal 
caucus and requiring all (former) “Liberal Senators” to sit in the upper house as independents: 
“Justin Trudeau Statement: ‘Senate is broken, and needs to be fixed’” (January 29, 2014), online: 
CBC <www.cbc.ca>.  
124  See Kahana, supra, note 73, at 30-32. 
125  Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2. 
126  Osborne, supra, note 114; Ontario Teachers, supra, note 116, at paras. 63-65. 
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alter the “essential characteristics” of the Senate without the consent of 
the provinces.
127
 In the Senate Reform Reference (2014), the parties often 
framed their submissions in terms of the analysis in the Upper House 
Reference. They often argued that the scope of Parliament’s unilateral 
amending power turned on whether the proposal for reform altered an 
essential characteristic of the Senate. The problem with this approach 
was that it does not account for the constitutional events of 1982, 
including the significant rewrite of the constitutional amending formulas. 
By mapping the Upper House Reference approach directly onto Part V, 
this analytical approach ignored the effect of Part V.
128
  
The text of Part V does not expressly set out the analytical steps that 
should be followed when deciding which amending formula applies to a 
particular constitutional amendment. But the substance, logic and 
configuration of Part V point to a two-step framework that can apply in 
all cases: Is the proposal an amendment to the Constitution of Canada? If 
yes, which amending formula applies? Indeed, in the Senate Reform 
Reference, the Court accepted this framework as the applicable analytical 
approach.
129
 
(a)  Step One: Scope 
The first step of the framework deals with the scope of Part V. The 
question to be answered is: Is the proposed action an amendment to the 
Constitution of Canada within the meaning of Part V?
 
This threshold 
question is true to the operative text of the amending procedures, which 
apply to “amendments” to the “Constitution of Canada”.130  
Recall, however, that the “Constitution of Canada” has multiple parts 
and there are multiple ways of changing it. If Part V is read to embody 
                                                                                                                                  
127  Upper House Reference, supra, note 25. 
128  The Court confirmed that Part V displaced all the existing rules of constitutional 
amendment in the Veto Reference, supra, note 25. The entrenchment of Part V does not render the 
Court’s reasoning in the Upper House Reference irrelevant. The particulars of Part V were, in part, a 
response to the Upper House Reference. The claim here is that in current cases of constitutional 
amendment, Part V must be the starting point. The task is to determine how, if at all, the Upper 
House Reference fits into the framework set by Part V, not the other way around. 
129  See, e.g., Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at paras. 21, 52-53, 54-67, 71. 
130  Sections 38(1), 41, 42, 43 and 47(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 each prescribe a 
formula for how an “amendment” to the “Constitution of Canada” “may be made”. Section 44 
provides that Parliament may exclusively make laws “amending the Constitution of Canada” in 
relation to certain matters. Note that s. 45 applies to amendments to “the constitution of a province”. 
For the purposes of this analysis, I focus on amendments to the Constitution of Canada. 
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such all-encompassing definitions, any amendment to the “entire global 
system” of constitutional rules and principles would trigger the Part V 
procedures. This cannot be the case. Defining “Constitution of Canada” 
in such broad terms for the purposes of Part V would legally entrench the 
entire political constitution and subject it to enforcement by the courts. 
This result would be contrary to the fundamental purpose and premises 
of a political constitution. Moreover, defining “Constitution of Canada” 
too broadly for the purposes of Part V would entrench the parts of the 
Constitution that are found within the common law and “ordinary” 
statutes, summarily elevating them to “supreme law”. Crystallization of 
these parts of the Constitution via judicial interpretation of “Constitution 
of Canada” would compromise the flexibility, exhaustiveness and 
responsiveness of the Constitution and raise concerns about the 
legitimacy of the courts in the process of constitution-making.
131
  
Instead, for the purposes of Part V, “Constitution of Canada” should 
refer only to the formal entrenched legal constitution. This would include 
the text of the instruments enumerated in subsection 52(2) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, as amended and interpreted over time.
132
 
Moreover, it would include at least some parts of the architecture or basic 
structure of the Constitution.
133
 As suggested in the Senate Reform 
Reference, it would include at least the foundational structures and core 
institutions of government envisioned by the Constitution, as well as 
their fundamental nature and role, as agreed to by the stakeholders in the 
federal compromise.
134
  
                                                                                                                                  
131  The political constitution evolves through informal means. The unentrenched parts of the 
legal constitution are subject to change through the “ordinary” process of the common law and 
legislative enactment and reform: Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 98; Osborne, supra, 
note 114, at 86-88; Patriation Reference, supra, note 25, at 880; Veto Reference, supra, note 25, at 
803; Ontario Teachers, supra, note 116, at 63-65. With respect to “supreme law”, see Constitution 
Act, 1982, s. 52(1).  
132  Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(1), (3); Gérin-Lajoie, supra, note 119. 
133  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 27. See also Supreme Court Act 
Reference, supra, note 2. 
134  Senate Reform Reference, id., at para. 26; Supreme Court Act Reference, id. In the Senate 
Reform Reference, the suggestion is that the Senate’s nature and role, while not described in explicit 
detail in the Constitution Act, 1867, is an assumption on which the constitutional text rests. That is, 
the internal architecture of the Senate’s design, and the structural relationships between the Senate 
and the House of Commons, reflect the framers’ vision of the government of Canada. This vision is 
not exhaustively set out in words, but the words that have been used are interpreted in light of the 
vision. The Court’s reasoning suggests that the architectural position of the Senate has always been 
part of the meaning of the Constitution because it reflects the common understanding of the parties 
to Confederation: see, e.g., Senate Reform Reference, at paras. 54-59. This differs from the Court’s 
reasoning in the Supreme Court Act Reference, in which the Court contends that the existence and 
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At the same time, just as “Constitution of Canada” cannot refer to all 
parts of the Constitution for the purposes of Part V, “amendment” cannot 
refer to all types of constitutional change. An amendment implemented 
by virtue of Part V becomes entrenched as part of the supreme law of 
Canada
135
 and subject to formal amendment only by virtue of the Part V 
procedures. It requires express approval by a process that has legitimacy 
in our democratic governance structure. Given the effects and formalities 
of Part V, “amendment” in the context of Part V should be concerned 
only with official legislative action that, in purpose or effect, changes the 
formal, entrenched parts of the Constitution of Canada. On this reading, a 
declaratory measure external to the constitutional texts would be 
insufficient to trigger Part V,
136
 but a “qualitative” or “substantive” 
change to the fundamental nature and role of a core constitutional 
institution could be enough.
137
 
The importance of the threshold question in the two-step analysis 
under Part V is obvious in the Senate Reform Reference. Any proposal that 
modifies the existing text of a constitutional document will clearly fall 
within the scope of Part V. Such was the case with the federal 
government’s questions about term limits for senators, removing the 
property qualifications for senators and abolishing the Senate.
138
 In 
contrast, the government’s proposal to implement a framework for 
consultative elections would not have added or deleted text from any 
constitutional document. But, as the Court confirmed, a constitutional 
amendment can alter the Constitution’s meaning without any textual 
change.
139
 With respect to consultative elections, “[w]hile the provisions 
regarding the appointment of Senators would remain textually untouched, 
                                                                                                             
essential features of the Supreme Court of Canada became constitutionally entrenched over time, 
through the operation of history, political practice and constitutional operation, and as confirmed in 
the patriation of the Constitution (paras. 76-95). In the Supreme Court Act Reference, the Court 
relies on traditional structural analysis not only to support the conclusion that dimensions of the 
Court are constitutionally entrenched, but also as support for the conclusion that the government is 
now obligated to maintain and protect the Supreme Court pursuant to s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 
1867, which on its face is a permissive grant of power to the federal government to establish a 
general court of appeal for the country (para. 101). While the Court’s analysis of the evolving role of 
the Supreme Court in Canada’s constitutional order is persuasive, accurate and an important account 
of our constitutional history, it raises questions about legitimacy in the process of entrenchment and 
the normative force of constitutional architecture.  
135  Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(1), (3). 
136  Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 106. 
137  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1; Supreme Court Act Reference, id., at para. 105. 
138  See reference questions 1, 4, 5, and 6, as set out in P.C. 2013-70. 
139  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 52. 
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the Senate’s fundamental nature and role as a complementary legislative 
body of sober second thought would be significantly altered.”140  
Accordingly, when a proposed enactment does not alter the text of 
the Constitution, it will always be necessary to consider whether the 
proposal would modify the Constitution’s meaning in ways that are not 
immediately obvious from a prima facie review of the text. Moreover, as 
the Court demonstrated in the Senate Reform Reference, determining 
whether a proposal would constitute a “qualitative change” to 
constitutional architecture will always entail a careful appreciation of the 
institutional and aspirational configuration and operation of the 
Constitution. It is only by understanding the Senate’s internal 
configuration and its role within Canada’s constitutional order that the 
Court could see the extent of the change that would flow from the 
implementation of a framework for consultative elections.
141
 
The Court demonstrated its careful appreciation of constitutional 
architecture in its holding that Part V applies when the foundational 
nature and role of core constitutional institutions are at stake. In doing so, 
it affirmed that the structure of the Constitution can have substantive 
status. Of course, many questions remain for future cases: What is the 
scope of the constitutional architecture that is entrenched? How do we 
determine the difference between entrenched and unentrenched 
architecture? What are the essential features of the institutions that 
comprise Canada’s constitutional architecture? Are there architectural 
elements, like the unwritten principles perhaps, that cannot be amended 
under Part V? At what point does an amendment to the constitutional 
architecture take us outside the existing constitutional scaffolding and 
into a new constitutional order?  
At the same time, the Court’s analysis of the consultative elections 
issue creates some confusion about the scope of Part V. By concluding 
that section 42(1)(b) applies to the “entire process” by which senators are 
selected, the Court rightly affirmed that the “method of selecting 
senators” is broader than simply the means by which senators are 
appointed.
142
 However, it simultaneously failed to distinguish between 
the entrenched and unentrenched parts of the selection process. The 
Court seemed to suggest that at least some of the conventional 
dimensions of the selection process are subject to the Part V amending 
                                                                                                                                  
140  Id. 
141  The same was true in the Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2. 
142  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 65. 
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procedures. If this is so, and if it is an indicator that constitutional 
conventions generally are subject to Part V, the future of constitutional 
evolution will be much more rigid than is called for by Part V. Moreover, 
it would raise concerns about how the conventions became entrenched 
and the legitimacy of that process.  
(b)  Step Two: Characterization 
If the proposed state action constitutes an amendment to the 
Constitution of Canada within the meaning of Part V, we move to the 
second step of the analysis. The second stage is an exercise in 
characterization and classification. The question is: Given that the 
proposed action is an amendment that falls within the scope of Part V, 
which amending formula applies? Akin to a “pith and substance” 
analysis in division of powers cases,
143
 answering this question involves 
construing the proposed amendment and the “heads of amendment” set 
out in Part V.
144
 The objective at the second stage of the analysis is to 
determine whether the amendment, in either subject or scope, looking to 
both purpose and effect, triggers an exception or variation to the general 
amending procedure. If it does not, then the general procedure applies. 
The analysis undertaken at the two stages of the framework should 
line up. We see this correspondence in the Court’s analysis of the tenure, 
property and abolition issues in the Senate Reform Reference. But the 
line is not as straight in the Court’s analysis of the consultative elections 
issue. At the first stage, the Court established that the government’s 
proposals to implement consultative elections were constitutional 
amendments within the scope of Part V because they would endow 
senators with a popular mandate inconsistent with the Senate’s role as a 
complementary legislative chamber of sober second thought.
145
 Yet, at 
the second stage, the Court held that the amendment would fall under 
“method of selecting senators” in section 42(1)(b) because the elections 
would change the process by which senators are selected. While it makes 
intuitive sense to conclude that a proposal to implement consultative 
                                                                                                                                  
143  For an overview of pith and substance, see Securities Reference, supra, note 49, at  
paras. 63-65 and Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 45, at paras. 25-27. 
144  In the Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, the Court rejects the Attorney General of 
Canada’s arguments that certain doctrines of pith and substance assist in the interpretation of Part V: 
see, e.g.. paras. 66-67. I agree. My point is that the thought process at the second stage of the Part V 
analysis is akin to that of a pith and substance analysis.  
145  Senate Reform Reference, id., at paras. 54-63, 70. 
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elections is an amendment in relation to “method of selecting senators”, 
the Court missed the step of explaining how the constitutional 
amendment it identified — a change to the fundamental character of the 
Senate — was in relation to the “method of selecting senators”. That is, 
the amendment was identified because of the effect of consultative 
elections on the Senate’s nature and role, but the amending formula was 
chosen because of the effect of consultative elections on the steps of the 
senatorial selection process. To straighten the line, the Court simply 
needed to explain that “method of selecting senators” in Part V captures 
not only the steps of the selection process, but also the unelected status of 
the Senate.  
VI. CONCLUSION: ALL I NEEDED TO KNOW ABOUT 
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE … 
The main issue in the Senate Reform Reference is how we should 
make sense of the amending formulae in Part V of the Constitution Act, 
1982. The Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue offers a lesson in 
constitutional structure. In fact, the lessons are multiple. 
First, we learn that traditional structural analysis helps in ascribing 
meaning to Part V. The theories of government and foundational values 
that underlie the Constitution of Canada give life to Part V; they infuse 
its formalities with meaning; they are its animating spirit; and they set 
the outer limits on the range of possible meanings of Part V. A traditional 
structural lens helps us to see how the amending formulae are a distinctly 
Canadian attempt to address the idiosyncrasies and insecurities that arise 
in the process of constitutional amendment. They provide a constitutional 
guarantee that the representative bodies of the Canadian electorate will 
have a voice in negotiations about the formal changes to the Constitution 
of Canada that meaningfully engage their interests.  
While the Court’s reasoning in the Senate Reform Reference 
confirms that structure is not a complete answer to interpretive questions, 
it teaches us that constitutional architecture is substantively significant. 
The architecture of the Constitution is constructed from the key 
presuppositions on which the rest of the Constitution is based; it 
contemplates the existence of particular institutions, their fundamental 
nature and role and the “basic structural imperatives” that govern them; it 
reflects a particular moment in constitutional history, linked to preceding 
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moments; and it has some measure of normative force.
146
 It is, in other 
words, not just an interpretive aid, but is also, at least in part, an 
entrenched part of the Constitution. 
Second, we learn from the Senate Reform Reference that Part V has 
an internal structure with some measure of interpretive force. While 
attention to internal structure can support the conclusion that Part V is a 
complete, comprehensive and principled code of amending formulae 
with coherent and principled units, the Court’s reasons show that internal 
structure does not have much interpretive weight beyond drawing 
attention to the ways in which the various amending formulas fit 
together. As the Court explained, “the manner in which the constitutional 
provisions are intended to interact with one another must inform our 
interpretation, understanding, and application of the text”.147 But while 
formal structure was one factor that helped the Court determine the scope 
of each amending procedure in relation to the others, it was not a priority 
when determining the internal meaning of each individual procedure.  
Third, the Senate Reform Reference teaches us that the logic of Part V 
is constitutive of constitutional structure. It establishes a two-step 
analytical framework that can be used to determine whether any enactment 
or proposal triggers Part V and, if so, which amending formula applies. 
The first step of the analysis is a matter of scope and the second a matter of 
classification. This framework can assist in safeguarding the non-
entrenched parts of the Constitution from ad hoc crystallization and in 
shielding the entrenched Constitution from indirect formal change that 
would have been more onerous, if not impossible, if done directly. 
The two-stage analytical framework offers a way to organize our 
thinking about how to formally amend the Constitution. Such 
organization requires a deep understanding of the Constitution as a 
whole. In addition, the framework serves as an ongoing reminder that the 
Constitution changes in multiple ways, both within and outside of the 
Part V procedures.
148
 In the context of the Senate Reform Reference, for 
example, the requirements of formal amendment may create the 
conditions in which a wider range of proposals and procedures for Senate 
reform can be imagined. 
                                                                                                                                  
146  Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 49-50; OPSEU, supra, note 2, at 57; 
Demers, supra, note 3, at para. 86, per LeBel J. 
147  Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 26. 
148  With respect to “liberat[ing] the creative spirit” through limits on freedom, see Fuller, 
“Means and Ends”, supra, note 85, at 65-75. 
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Finally, from these structural lessons, we learn another: that the 
design of Part V all but guarantees the courts a role in formal 
constitutional amendment. This guarantee flows from the text and 
structure of Part V, as well as the nature of the legal and political culture 
in Canada. In short, Part V sets out multiple amending procedures. To 
apply Part V, we must characterize and categorize proposed enactments 
according to their scope and subject matter. This is a familiar analytical 
exercise — it replicates the analysis in division of powers cases. In both, 
the nature of a proposed enactment and the meaning of constitutional 
heads of power must be interpreted and matched. In both, there are 
multiple items to be interpreted and multiple possible interpretations. 
And, in both, this process will often fall to the courts. The reliance on the 
courts flows from the inevitable interpretive controversies, the court-
centric orthodoxy of the Canadian legal environment, public confidence 
in the judicial process, a political culture that supports the use of the 
Court’s reference jurisdiction to resolve controversial questions, and the 
fraught climate that often surrounds proposals for constitutional change 
in Canada.
149
  
This is not to say that the courts will be, or should be, involved 
whenever we try to formally amend the Constitution. The Constitution of 
Canada has been amended pursuant to Part V without triggering 
litigation and will be so amended in the future.
150
 But, for the reasons 
already mentioned, it is likely that future attempts at formal 
constitutional amendment will be steered by the courts, whether directly 
or indirectly. Indeed, while critics often lament the fact that patriation 
bestowed greater power on the courts through the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,
151
 it should not be forgotten that the courts also 
secured a significant grant of power by virtue of the design of Part V. In 
the wake of the Court’s recent advisory opinions in the Senate Reform 
                                                                                                                                  
149  In the constitutional amendment context, see e.g., OPSEU, supra, note 2; Hogan, supra, 
note 25; Potter, supra, note 25; Penikett, supra, note 25; Campbell, supra, note 25; Secession 
Reference, supra, note 2; Q.C. Senate Reference, supra, note 25; Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 
1; Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 2. Even if the Court’s opinions in these cases render 
formal constitutional amendment more difficult to achieve in practice than it has already proven to be, 
the number of disputes over whether legislative enactments fall within the scope of Part V could rise as 
political actors try to implement constitutional change in indirect or peripheral ways. 
150  Moreover, it is possible that the Constitution has been formally amended in contravention 
of Part V without triggering litigation. Consider whether the An Act respecting constitutional 
amendments, S.C. 1996, c. 1 should have been enacted under Part V. 
151  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. 
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Reference and the Supreme Court Act Reference, some see this power as 
a hindrance to important institutional reforms and improper interference 
with political action. Yet ultimately the Supreme Court’s role in disputes 
over constitutional amendment is consistent with the metaphors that are 
often used to describe the Court’s role in constitutional judicial review 
generally, namely, guardian of the Constitution and umpire of federal-
provincial relations. Two questions that follow are: Are these the 
metaphors that we want to describe the Court’s role in cases of 
constitutional amendment? And, if yes, is constitutional amendment the 
inevitable new context for analysis through dialogue theory? Of course, 
these too are structural questions.  
 
